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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In  France,  the  supervisory  bodies  require  hospitals  and  nursing  homes  to  undergo  various  control  proce-
dures.  A  stack  of  legislation  and  control  measures  has  piled  up,  with  no  provision  for  their  interconnection
being  included  in  any  of  the legislation.  The  purpose  of  the  article  is  to  point  to the  prospects  for  better
control  opened  up  by  the  legislation  modernising  the  health  system  adopted  on  26  January  2016.  The
reform  will  neither  directly  change  the partitioning  between  the supervisory  bodies  preventing  the  shar-
ing  of  information  and the  harmonisation  of  the  practices  in terms  of  control,  nor  change  the  internal
partitioning  within  the supervisory  body.  But in  hospitals,  the  reform  will  improve  the  interconnection
of  control  of  quality/control  inspections/control  of strategy  using  a common  medical  project  and  pooling
certain  cross-cutting  functions,  and  implementing  the control  of quality  for the  new  local  hospital  group-ontrol system ings as a  whole.  In  nursing  homes,  the generalisation  of  multi-year  aims  and  means  contracts  would  allow
a  better  interconnection  of the  control  of strategy  and  the  control  of  quality  since  it  provides  managers
with  the means  of constructing  projects  for  the  evolution  of  their  establishments  over  a  period  of time,
and  accompanies  changes  in the  socio-medical  offer  to improve  the  provision  of  care.  These changes
would  allow  a more  credible,  coherent,  useful,  and  equitable  control.
© 2018  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license. Policy background
Various types of control have been imposed on hospitals and
ursing homes since the 1990s, creating a stack of controls with
o interconnection. This situation causes confusion and misun-
erstandings [1]. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the
ositive impact the new legislation modernising the health system
s expected to have on the various types of control (and the follow-
ng timeline shows the evolution of demands in terms of control
ince 1996).
To do so, the first part of the article presents the main dys-
unctions of control identified in an official report in 2013, and
heir consequences. The second part shows that other types of con-
rol were introduced after 2013, paradoxically without taking into
ccount the conclusions of the report. The last part shows that,
espite this situation, the legislation adopted on 26 January 2016
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration between Health
olicy and The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
∗ Corresponding author at: CNAM Equipe Santé Solidarité, Case Courrier 1D4P30,
92 Rue Saint Martin, 75141 Paris Cedex 03, France.
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ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.01.005
168-8510/© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC B(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
modernising the health system has resulted in changes and major
improvements in the control of both quality and strategy.
2. Issues in adaptation and implementation: dysfunctions
in the control of hospitals and nursing homes identified by
an official report in 2013
A report by the French Inspectorate General of Social Affairs
(Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales – IGAS) in April 2013 high-
lighted a major problem: the abundance of control and the absence
of any connection between the control of quality (carried out at
the national level), the other supervisory inspections carried out at
the local level, and the control of strategy carried out at the local
level [2]. The IGAS refers to a stack of procedures with no strategic
vision and no legibility, both within the supervisory bodies and at
hospitals and nursing homes [2], which has resulted in a degree of
reticence on the part of the establishments [3].
The control of strategy consists of checking achievement of
the strategic objectives selected in the framework of the multi-
year contract of aims and means (contrat pluriannuel d’objectifs et
de moyens – CPOM)  instituted by the Act of 22 July 2009. This con-
tract is negotiated and signed by a hospital (compulsory procedure
since 2009) or nursing home (optional procedure until 2016) and
Y-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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he supervisory body (the regional health agency (Agence Régionale
e Santé – ARS)) for a five-year period. In return for a budget alloca-
ion, the establishment undertakes to achieve, over that period, a
umber of objectives allowing the implementation of the regional
ealth project, guided by the supervisory body and drawn up on
he basis of national policy on public health. In fine, establishment
eads use a number of indicators to auto-supervise the CPOM and
eport the results obtained to the supervisory body. Eventually, if
here is no justification for failing to perform commitments, the
upervisory body may  terminate the CPOM and recover all or part
f the funding already paid out; it may  even cancel anticipated
nancing [4]. It is therefore important to state here that the control
f expenditure carried out in the context of the Diagnosis-Related
roup (DRG) payment is completely different. The DRG payment
ystem consists of checking that the funding of a hospital is in
eeping with its medical activity whereas, for the CPOM, finan-
ial control is carried out in the more generalised framework of
he control of strategy and also covers expenditure in connection
ith changes or developments in activities and the improvement
f quality [5].
Regarding the control of quality, the indicators supplied by the
stablishments to the supervisory bodies are different: some are
rawn up as part of the control of strategy (at the time of signing the
POM) and are sent to the supervisory body (ARS, at the regional
evel), while others cover the control of quality and are sent to a
ifferent supervisory body at the national level [5] (Haute Autorité
n Santé pour les hôpitaux (HAS) for hospitals, Agence Nationale de
’Évaluation et de la qualité des établissements et services Sociaux et
édico-sociaux – ANESM – for other establishments). Thus qual-
ty objectives are incorporated in the CPOM, but at the same time
uality is covered by another independent control, which makes
he control process more confusing and more cumbersome [4]. It
hould also be noted that the control of quality is not the same for
oth hospitals and nursing homes. The control of hospitals takes
lace every four to six years; it is carried out by independent experts
n the basis of a two-part reference framework of quality norms
rawn up by the supervisory body. The first part covers quality in
erms of management and quality in terms of dealing with patients.
f the results are not good, the supervisory body gives advice or
xpresses reservations, but the Act makes no provision for any
anctions. Nor may  there be any connection between the DRG pay-
ent system and control of the quality of the care provided. As a
esult, a hospital may  deliver lower quality care without its allo-
ation of resources being affected [5,6]. The control of quality in
ursing homes is provided for in the Act of 2 January 2002. It is
arried out every seven years by independent experts and covers
he pertinence of the activities and services delivered in relation to
he people dealt with and to their needs (children, elderly people,
ependent people, etc). The reference framework for quality norms
s selected by the nursing home and validated by the supervisory
ody (ANESM). This is very important for nursing homes since the
esults of the control determine the renewal of their operational
uthorisations. If the results are bad, the nursing home may  have
o close; this is not the case for hospitals.
It should also be emphasised that hospitals and nursing homes
re subject to various “control inspections” (inspections-contrôles
 IC).  Inspections are carried out if resources are being used inap-
ropriately or if an activity is not being carried out properly (when
t is thought that there are cases of physical abuse, for example).
ontrol covers observance of the rules, such as the regulations
ntroduced to combat nosocomial infections, and quality standards.
n IC may  lead the supervisory body to advise or impose action onhe part of the hospital or nursing home (for example, the Health
nsurance Funds may  check that hospitals are using the DRG-based
ayments system properly [5,6]). And yet the results of inspec-
ions are almost never used, whereas they could add a further122 (2018) 329–333
dimension to the control of strategy by influencing the choice of
objectives included in the CPOM. This detrimental situation results
in a wide range of differing practices within supervisory bodies
at the regional level. While some supervisory bodies consider the
control of quality and the various inspections to be partially inter-
changeable, and others feel that the reports on the control of quality
may  be used during an IC mission, others hold a contrary view [2].
3. Monitoring and outcomes: the consequences of the
unsuitability of the control system in hospitals and nursing
homes
The establishments themselves prefer to use the terms “assess-
ment” and “evaluation” rather than “control”, as professionals tend
to be rather suspicious of the concept of control: it is often consid-
ered on a par with reporting back to the supervisory body with a
view to sanctions rather than rewards. An illustration of this is the
actual case of a nursing home which had its operational authorisa-
tion withdrawn following an inspection, even though it had only
recently been renewed on the basis of the good results of an con-
trol of quality. The issue of the control of quality is a major one for
nursing homes since their operational authorisation depends on
it. Managers find it all the more difficult to understand why there
is both an control of quality and an control of strategy when they
have a number of points in common, although they are not inter-
connected, which explains why  they are being challenged (Fig. 1).
The suspicion that control generates, its unnecessary repetitive-
ness, and the amount of time it takes up tend to make the players
in the field reject them as management tools, as they often seem to
be rigid, constricting and lacking in credibility. Their aims are not
always understood, and their appropriation often takes the form of
individual strategies. The very nature of the tools leads these same
players to consider their activity no longer as something aimed at
achieving “the common good” but rather as a form of “manage-
rial logic”, perceived as lacking in humanism and, often, as being
pointless [8].
This feeling is further reinforced by the fact that the data pro-
duced by control is not always used correctly by the authority
bodies, as the ARSs have problems handling the data as a result
of serious internal partitioning [9].
It was this significantly flawed image of all the types of control
that made the ANESM publish an opinion clarifying the objectives
of the indicators devised as part of the control of quality. The opin-
ion states that while it is important to listen to the opposition put
forward by teams of professionals, control and the indicators it
generates remain pertinent in supporting the quality system [7].
The dysfunctions presented in the previous section, and the con-
sequences analysed above are summarized in Table 1.
4. Recent developments: constantly increasing amount of
control but prospects for improvement thanks to the
legislation adopted on 26 January 2016 modernising the
health system
4.1. New ANAP dashboards
Despite the publication of this report in 2013, yet another super-
visory body, a national agency in support of performance (Agence
Nationale d’Appui à la Performance – ANAP), requires hospitals and
nursing homes to maintain dashboards in order to ensure the con-
trol of performance. This new control is carried out completely
separately from the other types of control analysed in the first
part of this article [10]. For supervisory bodies, the aim is to gain a
better knowledge of the services available in a given area; for estab-
lishments, the aim is to provide information for internal control
S. Bertezene / Health Policy 122 (2018) 329–333 331
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Fig. 1. Timeline of the introduction or amendment of quality controls in French hospitals and nursing homes.
Table 1
Main dysfunctions in the control of hospitals and nursing homes.
Dysfunctions Consequences
Partitioning between the supervisory bodies preventing: Control considered unnecessarily repetitive, lacking in credibility, often
pointless and inequitable (by the people in charge of hospitals and nursing
homes).
-the  sharing of information connected with the various types of control,
-harmonisation of the practices of the supervisory bodies in terms of control.
Internal partitioning within the supervisory body, causing:
- difficulties in using the data produced by the various types of control,
-  an inability to link the control of strategy and the ICs.
Control inspections (ICs) connected with the DRG payment system carried out
separately from the control of the quality of care and medical treatment.
Control of strategy and control of quality are carried out separately, whereas Control of quality deemed cumbersome, partly unnecessarily repetitive with
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the control of strategy incorporated quality objectives.
Control of strategy carried out separately from the ICs (since the content of the
CPOM is chosen and supervised separately from the results of the ICs).
nd allow benchmarking between establishments. For hospitals,
he ANAP developed a dashboard in 2013 comprising 68 indicators
ivided into five categories: the activity, the quality of practices,
rganisational performance, use of human resources, and finance.
ursing homes have been required to use a different dashboard
ince 2015; this comprises 337 indicators, broken down into four
roups: provision of treatment and accompaniment for their res-
dents, human and material resources, finance and budget, and
bjectives.
Since 1 June 2017, the ANAP also proposes a corporate social
esponsibility (CSR) dashboard for nursing homes and hospitals.
his dashboard is not compulsory, but it enables those establish-
ents which so wish to draw up an inventory in every area of CSR
social, society, environment, economic) [11].
All these indicators are valuable and allow both the administra-
ion of the establishment by its management team and the control
f the establishment by the supervisory bodies. Once again, how-
ver, the indicators proposed by the ANAP are disconnected from
he other administrational indicators and may  seem unnecessarily
epetitive (supplied by the control of quality, the ICs and the control
f strategy via the CPOMs).
Acts, reforms and initiatives analysed (above and in the second
ection) make it possible to list the convergences and particularitiesregard to control of strategy
CPOM objectives selected and supervised separately. Control of strategy
considered incoherent since it takes no account of the ICs.
of control tools in hospitals and nursing homes (Tables 2 and 3).
There are two  convergences (hospitals and nursing homes are both
subjected to ICs and control of CSR), and many particularities:
- control of strategy is compulsory since the Act of 22 July 2009
in hospitals, but only since the Act of 26 January 2016 in nursing
homes;
- there is a single reference framework for quality standards for
all hospitals, while each nursing home may  choose its own ref-
erence framework for quality norms; if results are bad, a nursing
home may  have to close, but this is not the case for hospitals;
- ANAP dashboard includes only 68 performance indicators for
hospitals, compared to 337 for nursing homes.”
Despite these additional forms of control, the legislation mod-
ernising the health system allows a glimpse of possibilities for
rationalising and improving the control system. The Act comprises
227 Articles, focusing on three areas: prevention, access to treat-
ment, and the rights and safety of patients. The Act has attracted
attention from the media and the general public mainly because
it deals with issues of major importance to society: experimen-
tal opening of safe injecting rooms to reduce risks connected with
the use of drugs, introduction of nutrition information on food
packaging to combat obesity and diabetes, introduction of neu-
tral packaging for cigarettes (with no logo and no possibility of
332 S. Bertezene / Health Policy 122 (2018) 329–333
Table 2
Convergences of control tools.
Hospitals and nursing homes Supervisory body Legislation
IC: inspections and control in connection with physical
abuse, nosocomial infections, DRG payment, etc.
ARS and other supervisory bodies (labour
inspectorate, etc.)
Dozens of Acts over more than 30 years
Control  of CSR: 32 indicators connected not only with the
social, society, economic and environmental aspects of
CSR, but also with purchasing and the governance of CSR
ANAP 2017
Table 3
Particularities of control tools.
Arrangements for the control of
hospitals
Supervisory body
concerned
Year of
implementation
Arrangements for the control
of  nursing homes
Supervisory body
concerned
Year of
implementation
Control of strategy (via the CPOM):
control of financial objectives,
improvement in quality, etc.
ARS Compulsory since the
Act of 22 July 2009
Control of strategy (via the
CPOM): control of financial
objectives, improvement in
quality, etc
ARS Compulsory since
the Act of 26
January 2016
Control of quality: single reference
framework for quality standards
for all public and private
hospitals in France
If the results are bad, the hospital
remains open.
HAS Compulsory since the
Orders of 24 April 1996
Control of quality: each
nursing home may  choose its
own  reference framework for
quality norms
If the results are bad, the
nursing home may  have to
close
ANESM Act of 2 January
2002
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dvertising), introduction of the possibility of class actions in the
ealth field, etc. What we are interested in here is above all two
ess visible but nevertheless major changes in the organisation of
he health system that affect the control of hospitals and nursing
omes.
.2. Better interconnection of control of quality/ICs/control of
trategy thanks to the new local hospital groupings
groupements hospitaliers de territoire – GHT)?
The GHT is an innovation introduced by the Act of 26 January
016 with a view to improving the quality of patient care and ratio-
alising the use of resources. To achieve this, the hospitals in a given
rea are required to define a shared strategy for providing patient
are, using a common medical project and pooling certain cross-
utting functions (information systems, purchasing, training, etc).
HTs are compulsory for public hospitals, and optional for private
ospitals. Each GHT is headed by one of its member hospitals.
Each establishment retains its own CPOM; there is no single
POM for hospitals in a given GHT. Nevertheless, it is likely that the
HT will achieve a better interconnection of the control of quality
nd the control of strategy. Indeed the major consequence of the
HTs is the implementation of control of quality for the GHT as a
hole from 2020 onwards (and no longer for each establishment
eparately, as is the case at present). Some GHTs have decided to
nticipate the new rule, and 26 commitment agreements (conven-
ions d’engagement) have already been signed with the supervisory
ody (HAS) to date (involving 66 hospitals) [12]. Carrying out a joint
ontrol of quality (Article L 6132-4 of the Act of 26 January 2016)
akes it possible to replace a logic of competition among hospitals
y a territorial logic based on a federated hospital system, which
ther hospitals may  join if they wish.
The coercive and negative perception of control is thus atten-
ated in favour of a more collaborative, positive perception. The
eople in charge of the hospitals recognise in this new form of con-
rol of quality a real ability to create or develop synergies and links
mong the professionals at the various hospitals. As a result, hos-
itals and their quality departments are starting to carry out workControl of performance: 337
indicators
ANAP 2015
on defining and implementing a common quality and risk manage-
ment system on the scale of the GHT. This total reorganisation of
the system for the control of quality affects the control of strategy,
which points to the hope of a better interconnection of the various
processes.
4.3. Better interconnection between the control of quality and the
control of strategy thanks to the multi-year aims and means
contracts?
The multi-year aims and means contracts (contrats pluriannuels
d’objectifs et de moyens – CPOMs) are no longer optional; they are
now compulsory for nursing homes. About 9 000 nursing homes
will have to sign their CPOM with their supervisory bodies before
2022. Not only may the same CPOM be signed by a number of nurs-
ing homes belonging to the same group (a large association, for
example, or a private commercial group); it may  also be signed by
partners such as a school (in connection with projects for caring for
handicapped children, for example).
The report drawn up by the independent experts carrying out
the control of quality at each nursing home could provide a partic-
ularly valuable basis for defining the objectives of the CPOM and
hence the strategy of each signatory nursing home for the follow-
ing five years. In this respect, the CPOM indeed becomes a major
tool in the control of strategy, but its generalisation also makes it
possible to envisage the control of quality on the scale of a group
of establishments rather than on that of a single establishment.
As a result, the generalisation of CPOMs will allow a better inter-
connection of the control of strategy and the control of quality
since:
- it provides managers with the means of constructing projects
for the evolution of their establishments over a period of time, by
providing a multi-year framework for objectives and funding,
- it accompanies changes in the socio-medical offer to improve
the provision of care, accompaniment, and the logic of the route
followed by patients.
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. Conclusion
An IGAS report published in 2013 denounced the pile-up and
ncoherence of control procedures in hospitals and nursing homes.
aradoxically, since 2013, the requirements made of controls have
ncreased constantly. But at the same time, the legislation adopted
n 26 January 2016 offers a glimpse of prospects for improvement
ith the introduction of a better interconnection between the con-
rol of quality/other ICs/the control of strategy.
The 2016 reform will neither directly change the partitioning
etween the supervisory bodies preventing the sharing of informa-
ion and the harmonisation of the practices in terms of control, nor
hange the internal partitioning within the supervisory body, nor
hange the DRG payment system. But in hospitals the reform will
llow a better interconnection of control of quality/ICs/control of
trategy using a common medical project and pooling certain cross-
utting functions (information systems, purchasing, training, etc.)
nd the most important, implementing the control of quality for the
HT as a whole (and no longer for each establishment separately,
s is the case at present). These changes will allow a more useful
nd less cumbersome control of quality. Also, in nursing homes the
eneralisation of multi-year aims and means contracts will allow
 better interconnection of the control of strategy and the control
f quality since it provides managers with the means of construct-
ng projects for the evolution of their establishments over a period
f time (by providing a multi-year framework for objectives and
unding), and accompanies changes in the socio-medical offer to
mprove the provision of care, accompaniment, and the logic of the
oute followed by patients.
It would be difficult to transfer the control system to another
ountry, but the lessons to be drawn from experience of the system
an be applied anywhere in the world. Indeed many researchers
ave demonstrated the influence of the control system on the strat-
gy adopted by an organisation [13–15]. They stress the need for
nteraction and discussion among the stakeholders if the control is
o be useful and pertinent for decision-making on strategies (both
y the people in charge of the establishments and by the super-
isory bodies) [16,17]. This was really not the case in France until
016, when the legislation modernising the health system at last
aised some hope not only of better dialogue among the various
upervisory bodies and the establishments, but also of a better
nterconnection of the various ICs and the control of strategy.
[
122 (2018) 329–333 333
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